

ROBERT GELLMAN
Privacy and Information Policy Consultant
419 Fifth Street SE
Washington, DC 20003

202-543-7923
bob@bobgellman.com
www.bobgellman.com

FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: A Basic History

Robert Gellman

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I maintain this document at <http://www.bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf>. You can also find it at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2415020.

Summary

This report offers a history of **Fair Information Practices** (FIPs) with a focus – but not an exclusive one – on activities in the United States. The text usually quotes key portions of source documents in order to allow for comparison of different versions of FIPs. For the most part, the analysis is neutral, with only limited interpretation, comment, and criticism.

FIPs are a set of internationally recognized practices for addressing the privacy of information about individuals. Information privacy is a subset of privacy. FIPs are important because they provide the underlying policy for many national laws addressing privacy and data protection matters. The international policy convergence around FIPs as core elements for information privacy has remained in place since the late 1970s. Privacy laws in the United States, which are much less comprehensive in scope than laws in some other countries, often reflect some elements of FIPs but not as consistently as the laws of most other nations.

FIPs began in the 1970s with a report from the Department of Health, Education & Welfare. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development revised the principles in a document that became influential internationally. FIPs have evolved over time, with different formulations coming from different countries and different sources over the decades. A 2013 revision by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development retained the original statement of privacy principles. Elements in addition to FIPs are increasingly recognized today as part of international privacy policy discussions, standards, and laws.

* Privacy and Information Policy Consultant, Washington, DC; former Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Subcommittee on Government Information, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives; J.D. 1973, Yale Law School. <http://www.bobgellman.com>.

I. Origins of FIPs

In a 1973 report, a U.S. government advisory committee initially proposed and named Fair Information Practices as a set of principles for protecting the privacy of personal data in record-keeping systems. The Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems issued the report, *Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens*.¹ Elliot Richardson, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, established the committee in response to growing use of automated data systems containing information about individuals. The Committee's charge included automated data systems containing information about individuals maintained by both public and private sector organizations.

The chairman of the advisory committee was Willis H. Ware from The Rand Corporation in California. Ware remained an influential expert on privacy matters in following decades. He later served as Vice Chairman of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, a temporary study commission established in the United States by law in 1974.

The central contribution of the Advisory Committee was the development of a code of fair information practices for automated personal data systems.² According to Ware, the name *Code of Fair Information Practices* was inspired by the Code of Fair Labor Practices.³

¹ <http://epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/default.html>.

² It has often been said that reports by commissions and advisory committee end up *gathering dust on a shelf*, meaning that they are ignored. The HEW Advisory Committee was, perhaps, one of the most influential reports of its type, with long-lasting international effects that continue more than forty years later. See Robert Gellman, *Willis Ware's Lasting Contribution to Privacy: Fair Information Practices*, 12 IEEE Security & Privacy 51 (2014), <http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MSP.2014.82>. See also Deirdre K. Mulligan, *The Enduring Importance of Transparency*, 12 IEEE Security & Privacy 61(2014), <http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MSP.2014.58>; K Evans, *Where in the World Is My Information?: Giving People Access to Their Data*, 12 IEEE Security & Privacy 78(2014), <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/tocresult.jsp?isnumber=6924618#>.

³ Willis Ware, Addendum A, *A Historical Note* at page 50 in *Health Records: Social Needs and Personal Privacy* (1993) (Conference Proceedings) (Task Force on Privacy, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation and the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, U.S Department of Health and Human Services), <http://aspe.hhs.gov/pic/reports/ahrq/4441.pdf>. The link to this report is dead. The story also appears in Willis H. Ware, *RAND AND THE INFORMATION EVOLUTION A History in Essays and Vignettes* at 157 (2008) (RAND), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/corporate_pubs/2008/RAND_CP537.pdf. I reproduce the key paragraphs here in case the book disappears from the web.

After such a drafting/review meeting, David [Martin], Carole [Parsons], and I were sitting around a table in the north building of the old HEW complex, probably on the 5th floor which was where the offices of the committee were. It would have been around dinner time and other people, mostly friends of David, drifted in and out. We were winding down after the day and chatting about various details of the report.

Someone came into the room, was introduced to me, and [I believe] was also characterized as having worked with or was presently with the Department of Labor. The 3 of us had been talking about our list of protective mechanisms and I suspect toying with names for it.

The individual who had drifted in mused out loud to the effect: "What we're talking about is just like the Code of Fair Labor Practices." That was a pivotal comment and promptly, David Martin first voiced the phrase "Code of Fair Information Practices." I believe we might have bandied about variations on the phrase—such as where to put the word "fair"—but one struck us as best and has survived.

The identity of the individual who commented about the similarity to the Fair Labor Practices is uncertain. There is a possibility that it was John Fanning, presently with USPHS. He believes it was not he, so for the moment, the person's identity is unknown.

The Committee's original formulation of the Code was:

Safeguards for personal privacy based on our concept of mutuality in record keeping would require adherence by record-keeping organizations to certain fundamental principles of fair information practice.

- There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret.
- There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and how it is used.
- There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his consent.
- There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable information about himself.
- Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the data.

In 2014, Professor Chris Hoofnagle from the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology posted transcripts from many of the Secretary's Advisory Committee hearings in 1972.⁴ This is a useful resource to those interested in the origins FIPs. Hoofnagle also provided summaries of the meetings. The transcripts and the summaries are a major contribution to the history of privacy.

At approximately the same time the HEW Advisory Committee was established, a similar study about privacy and computers was already underway in Great Britain. A Committee on Privacy chaired by the Rt. Hon. Kenneth Younger was restricted in its terms of reference to private and not public organizations that might threaten privacy.⁵ To address the potential threats to privacy posed by computerized data, the Younger Committee recommended specific safeguards for automated personal data systems. The main features of the safeguards are:

It is clear however that David Martin did coin the phrase "Code of Fair Information Practices" and that it occurred in the period between December 1972 and March 1973. Since the December event was only a week before Christmas, and drafting really got started in January, it is likely that the actual date is in February or the first part of March, 1973.

⁴ <https://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/bclt/research/privacy-at-bclt/archive-of-the-meetings-of-the-secretarys-advisory-committee-on-automated-personal-data-systems-sacapds/>.

⁵ Great Britain, Home Office, *Report of the Committee on Privacy* (1972) (Rt. Hon. Kenneth Younger, Chairman). This report is not available online. See Appendix B of the 1973 HEW Report for a brief review of the Younger Committee report. <http://epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/appenb.htm>. The official copy of the Younger Committee report is available at the British National Archives, but the report is not available in a digital format. <http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/details/C11027826?descriptiontype=Full>.

1. Information should be regarded as held for a specific purpose and not to be used, without appropriate authorization, for other purposes.
2. Access to information should be confined to those authorized to have it for the purpose for which it was supplied.
3. The amount of information collected and held should be the minimum necessary for the achievement of the specified purpose.
4. In computerized systems handling information for statistical purposes, adequate provision should be made in their design and programs for separating identities from the rest of the data.
5. There should be arrangements whereby the subject could be told about the information held concerning him.
6. The level of security to be achieved by a system should be specified in advance by the user and should include precautions against the deliberate abuse or misuse of information.
7. A monitoring system should be provided to facilitate the detection of any violation of the security system.
8. In the design of information systems, periods should be specified beyond which the information should not be retained.
9. Data held should be accurate. There should be machinery for the correction of inaccuracy and the updating of information.
10. Care should be taken in coding value judgments.

The Younger Committee's safeguards contain many of the same elements as the Code of Fair Information Practices proposed by the HEW Advisory Committee. According to one privacy scholar, it is impossible to judge how one committee may have influenced the other.⁶

The Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC) also may have contributed to the development of FIPs principles in its 1977 report, Protecting Privacy in an Information Society.⁷ In chapter 13 on the Privacy Act of 1974, the PPSC credited the work of the Congress during the drafting of the Privacy Act of 1974 as inspiration for the PPSC's refining of the five HEW

⁶ Colin J. Bennett, Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States at 99 (1992). Bennett's book is especially useful for its discussion of how international privacy policy converged about FIPs during the 1970s and 1980s.

⁷ The Government Printing Office published the Commission's report. The Department of Health and Human Services has a partial copy at <http://aspe.hhs.gov/report/personal-privacy-information-society>. A complete version of the report (with all appendices) is on the Electronic Privacy Information Center at <https://epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/>.

principles into eight principles. The words of the eight principles were the work of the PPSC and not the Congress, however.⁸

1. There shall be no personal-data record-keeping system whose very existence is secret and there shall be a policy of openness about an organization's personal-data record-keeping policies, practices, and systems. (The Openness Principle)

2. An individual about whom information is maintained by a record-keeping organization in individually identifiable form shall have a right to see and copy that information. (The Individual Access Principle)

3. An individual about whom information is maintained by a record-keeping organization shall have a right to correct or amend the substance of that information. (The Individual Participation Principle)

4. There shall be limits on the types of information an organization may collect about an individual, as well as certain requirements with respect to the manner in which it collects such information. (The Collection Limitation Principle)

5. There shall be limits on the internal uses of information about an individual within a record-keeping organization. (The Use Limitation Principle)

6. There shall be limits on the external disclosures of information about an individual a record-keeping organization may make. (The Disclosure Limitation Principle)

7. A record-keeping organization shall bear an affirmative responsibility for establishing reasonable and proper information management policies and practices which assure that its collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information about an individual is necessary and lawful and the information itself is current and accurate. (The Information Management Principle)

8. A record-keeping organization shall be accountable for its personal-data record-keeping policies, practices, and systems. (The Accountability Principle)⁹

The structure of the PPSC version closely resembles the later restatement by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The OECD version of FIPs has some differences from the PPSC version, including renaming of one principle, reorganizing several principles, and some mild substantive revisions.

⁸ PPSC Report at 501, n.5.

⁹ PPSC Report at 501-502 (footnote omitted), <http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/1977privacy/c13.htm>. Note that the language that appears on the website of the Department of Health and Human Services Data Council contains a typographical error. A wayward carriage return in the middle of principle 2 produced an apparent nine principles, but the printed report shows eight principles, and there are eight named principles.

II. Evolution of FIPs

A. Origins and Early History

In the 1970s, European nations began to enact privacy laws applicable to the public and private sectors, beginning with Sweden (1973), the Federal Republic of Germany (1977), and France (1978). These laws were consistent with FIPs. Even laws that predated FIPs – including the 1970 Hesse (Germany) law and even the 1970 American Fair Credit Reporting Act – reflect the main elements of FIPs.

As privacy laws spread to other countries in Europe, international institutions took up privacy with a focus on the international implications of privacy regulation. In 1980, the Council of Europe adopted a *Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data*.¹⁰ The Convention stated “it is desirable to extend the safeguards for everyone's rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular the right to the respect for privacy, taking account of the increasing flow across frontiers of personal data undergoing automatic processing.” The Convention was the first legally binding international treaty on data protection.

The basic principles for data protection in the Council of Europe Convention addressed quality of data, special categories of data, and data security. A data subject should have the right to establish the existence and main purposes of an automated personal data file; the right to confirm whether personal data relating to the data subject are stored in the file; the right to see the data and to rectify or erase the data; and the right to have a remedy for failure to comply with other rights.

The Council of Europe maintains a data protection webpage that includes, among other things, information on new signatories to the Convention and reports on the modernization of the Convention, which started in 2013.¹¹ The Ad hoc Committee on data protection approved a modernization proposal in December 2014.¹²

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) proposed similar privacy guidelines around the same time as the Council of Europe's original 1980 effort. A group of government experts under the chairmanship of The Hon. Mr. Justice M.D. Kirby, Chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission, developed the *OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data*. The OECD adopted the recommendation, which became applicable on 23 September 1980.¹³

¹⁰ Council of Europe, European Treaty Series No. 108, <http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm>.

¹¹ http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/Default_en.asp.

¹² http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/TPD_documents/CAHDATA-RAP03Abr_En.pdf.

¹³ <http://www.oecd.org/internet/interneteconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm>.

The eight principles set out by the OECD are:

Collection Limitation Principle

There should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.

Data Quality Principle

Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete, and kept up-to-date.

Purpose Specification Principle

The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose.

Use Limitation Principle

Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with [the Purpose Specification Principle] except: a) with the consent of the data subject; or b) by the authority of law.

Security Safeguards Principle

Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data.

Openness Principle

There should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the data controller.

Individual Participation Principle

An individual should have the right: a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data relating to him; b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him within a reasonable

time; at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; in a reasonable manner; and in a form that is readily intelligible to him; c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and d) to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful to have the data erased, rectified, completed or amended.

Accountability Principle

A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures, which give effect to the principles stated above.

Along with the 1980 Privacy Guidelines, the OECD issued an explanatory memorandum whose purpose was to “explain and elaborate the Guidelines and the basic problems of protection of privacy and individual liberties.”¹⁴

Both the Council of Europe Convention and the OECD Guidelines relied on FIPs as core principles, although neither document used the term. Both organizations revised and extended the original U.S. statement of FIPs, with the OECD Privacy Guidelines being the version most often cited in subsequent years.

As with other versions of FIPs, the OECD Guidelines generally proposed rights and remedies for data subjects while assigning responsibilities to record keepers. The OECD, Council of Europe, and the European Union expressly recognized that disparities in national privacy legislation might create obstacles to the free flow of information between countries. Harmonizing national privacy standards was a major purpose of privacy activities by international organizations, along with the protection of individual privacy interests. The goal of harmonization helped to raise interest in privacy among the business community.

B. Recent History

In 2013, the OECD issued revised guidelines in a document titled *The OECD Privacy Framework*.¹⁵ The foreword to the document noted that, “as compared with the situation 30 years ago, there has been a profound change of scale in terms of the role of personal data in our economies, societies, and daily lives,” and that “[t]he environment in which the traditional privacy principles are now implemented has undergone significant changes.”¹⁶

It is noteworthy that the Expert Group that prepared the revisions did not amend the eight basic principles from the 1980 Guidelines. The OECD version of FIPs remained unchanged, while other materials were adjusted and added.

¹⁴ *OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Explanatory Memorandum* at Introduction, <http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheProtectionofPrivacyandTransborderFlowsOfPersonalData.htm#memorandum>.

¹⁵ http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf. The document includes a wealth of materials, including the original 1980 guidelines and explanatory materials, a 2013 supplementary explanatory memorandum, and a 2011 OECD paper titled: *The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the OECD Privacy Guidelines*.

¹⁶ *Id* at 3.

The Expert Group took the view that the balance reflected in the eight basic principles of Part Two of the 1980 Guidelines remains generally sound and should be maintained. The Expert Group introduced a number of new concepts to the OECD privacy framework, such as privacy management programmes, security breach notification, national privacy strategies, education and awareness, and global interoperability. Other aspects of the 1980 Guidelines were expanded or updated, such as accountability, transborder data flows and privacy enforcement.¹⁷

It is beyond the scope of this document to fully describe or evaluate how the OECD revised its privacy guidance and accompanying documentation. The 2013 explanatory memorandum takes into account the many changes in international privacy activities, privacy laws, and privacy policy that took place between 1980 and 2013. The OECD placed a greater emphasis on management, transborder data flows, security breach notification, enforcement and management, and international cooperation.

The Australian Privacy Foundation (APF), which represents privacy advocates, found the decision to leave the basic principles from 1980 unchanged to be a “missed opportunity to respond to the developments of the last 35 years.” APF found the new part on implementing accountability to be the “only significant positive addition.” APF also criticized other changes that appear to restrict “the ability of countries to limit exports of personal information to jurisdictions with weaker privacy standards.” In general, APF opposed continuing recognition of the revised OECD Guidelines as an international data privacy standard, but it found the basic principles “continue to play a useful role as a minimum set of data privacy principles which it is valuable for countries to enact if they [have] no data privacy law and it is not possible for them to enact stronger provisions, in preference to no data privacy law at all.”¹⁸

III. Statutory and Other Implementations of FIPs

The HEW Advisory Committee’s recommendation for a federal privacy statute resulted in the first statutory implementation of FIPs anywhere in the world. The Privacy Act of 1974¹⁹ applies FIPs to federal agencies in the United States. Massachusetts enacted a Fair Information Practices chapter to its general laws in 1975.²⁰ However, it was not until 2002 that the U.S. Congress first formally referenced FIPs in a statute. In establishing a privacy office at the Department of

¹⁷ Id. at 22.

¹⁸ Australian Privacy Foundation, *International Data Privacy Standards: A Global Approach* (Australian Privacy Foundation Policy Statement) at section 2 (17 Sept. 2013), <http://www.privacy.org.au/Papers/PS-IntlDP.pdf>.

¹⁹ 5 U.S.C. § 552a. <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a>. The findings and the purposes of the original Act – Public Law 93-579 – reflect the influence of the HEW Advisory Committee. Congress based the substantive provisions of the Act largely on the Committee’s report.

²⁰ Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 66A, <https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleX/Chapter66A>. The Massachusetts law applies to state agencies and contractors a version of FIPs that bears some similarities to the federal Privacy Act of 1974.

Homeland Security, the Congress assigned the office responsibility for assuring compliance with fair information practices as set out in the Privacy Act of 1974.²¹

Around the same time that the U.S. enacted the Privacy Act of 1974, European countries began to pass national privacy laws applicable to the public and private sectors. The policies contained in FIPs formed the basis for most national laws. Pressure grew in Europe for more uniformity in privacy law.

In 1995, the EU adopted Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.²² The reliance on FIPs by the European Union in its data protection directive ensured the spread of FIPs throughout Europe.

The Directive restricted the export of personal information to third countries that did not ensure an “adequate level of protection”. This encouraged some other countries to conform their laws to the FIPs principles that formed the basis of the directive. National laws found by the EU to be adequate are available at an EU Data Protection webpage.²³

Canada took a different procedural approach in the early 1990s when it sought to establish a privacy *standard*. The Canadian Standards Association (CSA) led the Canadian privacy effort. Representatives of all stakeholders, including government, business, and consumer interests participated in the process. CSA published the Model Code as a National Standard of Canada in 1996.²⁴ The CSA standard follows the international consensus on FIPs. The CSA standard has ten interrelated principles that readily map to the basic principles of the OECD Guidelines.²⁵ In 2000, Canada enacted the standard directly into law as the basis for its private sector privacy legislation.²⁶

²¹ 6 U.S.C. § 142(a)(2), <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/6/142>. The language was reportedly added at the suggestion of several privacy advocates. Similar FIPs language can be found in 50 U.S.C. § 3029(b)(5), <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3029>, (establishing a Civil Liberties Protection Officer within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence), and in 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-2, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000ee-2>, (requiring the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the head of any other department, agency, or element of the executive branch designated by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to have a privacy and civil liberties officer). Another reference to FIPs in U.S. Code is at 49 U.S.C. § 31306a(d)(1) that establishes a national clearinghouse for controlled substance and alcohol test results of commercial motor vehicle operators which must comply with applicable Federal privacy laws, including the fair information practices under the Privacy Act of 1974, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/49/31306a>.

²² <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:NOT>.

²³ http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/international-transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm.

²⁴ <http://www.csa.ca/cm?c=Page&childpagename=CSA%2FLayout&cid=1239124810319&packedargs=item-context%3Dca%252Fen%252Fnull&pagename=CSA%2FRenderPage>.

²⁵ The ten CSA principles are: 1) Accountability; 2) Identifying Purposes; 3) Consent 4) Limiting Collection; 5) Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention; 6) Accuracy; 7) Safeguards; 8) Openness; 9) Individual Access; 10) Challenging Compliance.

²⁶ Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-8.6/index.html>. The CSA code is in Schedule 1 (Section 5) of PIPEDA at <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-8.6/page-23.html#h-26>.

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services relied upon FIPs in issuing a privacy rule under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). In adopting the rule, HHS said, “This final rule establishes, for the first time, a set of basic national privacy standards and fair information practices that provides all Americans with a basic level of protection and peace of mind that is essential to their full participation in their care.”²⁷ The Department did not restate FIPs principles. The HIPAA privacy rule implements all FIPs principles in some way, but the collection limitation principle is lightly applied, presumably because HHS did not want to tell health care providers what information to include in a health record.

IV. More U.S. Versions of FIPs

While there is broad international agreement on the substance of FIPs, different statements of FIPs sometimes look different. Further, statutory implementations of FIPs may vary in different countries, contexts, and sectors. There can be multiple ways to comply with FIPs for different types of records and record keepers.

In the United States, occasional laws required some elements of FIPs for specific classes of record keepers or categories of records. Otherwise, private sector compliance with FIPs principles, while increasing, is mostly voluntary and sporadic. In addition, shortened or incomplete versions of FIPs have sometimes been offered in the United States by federal agencies or trade associations. *Notice and choice* is sometimes presented as an implementation of FIPs, but it clearly falls well short of FIPs standards. Other incomplete versions of FIPs can also be found.

A. 1998 & 2000 FTC

In a 1998 report, the Federal Trade Commission identified the “five core principles of privacy protection: (1) Notice/Awareness; (2) Choice/Consent; (3) Access/Participation; (4) Integrity/Security; and (5) Enforcement/Redress.”²⁸ In 2000, the Commission recommended that commercial websites that collect personal identifying information from or about consumers online should be required to comply with “the four widely-accepted fair information practices.”

(1) Notice - Web sites would be required to provide consumers clear and conspicuous notice of their information practices, including what information they collect, how they collect it (e.g., directly or through non-obvious means such as cookies), how they use it, how they provide Choice, Access, and Security to consumers, whether they disclose the information collected to other entities, and whether other entities are collecting information through the site.

²⁷ Department of Health and Human Services, Final Rule, *Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information*, 65 Federal Register 82462, 82464 (Dec. 28, 2000) at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-12-28/pdf/00-32678.pdf>. See also id. at 82487 (“...our privacy regulation [is] based on common principles of fair information practices.”).

²⁸ Federal Trade Commission, *Privacy Online: A Report to Congress* 7 (1998), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/exploring-privacy-roundtable-series/priv-23a_0.pdf.

(2) Choice - Web sites would be required to offer consumers choices as to how their personal identifying information is used beyond the use for which the information was provided (e.g., to consummate a transaction). Such choice would encompass both internal secondary uses (such as marketing back to consumers) and external secondary uses (such as disclosing data to other entities).

(3) Access - Web sites would be required to offer consumers reasonable access to the information a Web site has collected about them, including a reasonable opportunity to review information and to correct inaccuracies or delete information.

(4) Security - Web sites would be required to take reasonable steps to protect the security of the information they collect from consumers.²⁹

The 2000 FTC's version of FIPs includes only notice, choice, access and correction, and security. The FTC's 2000 set of privacy standards restates, waters down, and leaves out some FIPs elements. Curiously, the 2000 report references the 1998 report and, in one place but not another, mentions that the previous report identified *enforcement* as a "critical component". However, the 2000 report fails to include enforcement as a specific FIPs element, reducing the number of FIPs from five in the 1998 report to four in the 2000 report.³⁰ Then later, the report states that "[i]n addition to the substantive fair information practice principles of Notice, Choice, Access, and Security, a fifth principle is essential to ensuring consumer protection: Enforcement."³¹ The inconsistent accounting of FIPs by the Commission in these two reports is curious.

A December 2010 FTC staff report appeared to acknowledge that the Commission's previous version of FIPs was incomplete and insufficient. It observed, "Additionally, the emphasis on notice and choice alone has not sufficiently accounted for other widely recognized fair information practices, such as access, collection limitation, purpose specification, and assuring data quality and integrity."³² This comment adds *data quality and integrity* to what the Commission staff called a list of *widely recognized fair information practices*, but this list did not include enforcement. From 1998 through 2010, the Commission's description of FIPs has been consistently inconsistent.

B. 2008 DHS

²⁹ Federal Trade Commission, *Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace* 36-37, (May 2000) (footnote omitted), <http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000.pdf>.

³⁰ Id. at 4.

³¹ Id. at 20.

³² Federal Trade Commission, *Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policymakers* 20 (2010) (Preliminary FTC Staff Report) 20, <http://ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf>. The comment appears to have vanished when the final report was published. See Federal Trade Commission, *Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and PolicyMakers* (2012), <http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf>.

In 2008, the Privacy Office at the Department of Homeland Security offered its own version of FIPs called Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPS):

- Transparency: DHS should be transparent and provide notice to the individual regarding its collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance of personally identifiable information (PII).
- Individual Participation: DHS should involve the individual in the process of using PII and, to the extent practicable, seek individual consent for the collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance of PII. DHS should also provide mechanisms for appropriate access, correction, and redress regarding DHS's use of PII.
- Purpose Specification: DHS should specifically articulate the authority that permits the collection of PII and specifically articulate the purpose or purposes for which the PII is intended to be used.
- Data Minimization: DHS should only collect PII that is directly relevant and necessary to accomplish the specified purpose(s) and only retain PII for as long as is necessary to fulfill the specified purpose(s).
- Use Limitation: DHS should use PII solely for the purpose(s) specified in the notice. Sharing PII outside the Department should be for a purpose compatible with the purpose for which the PII was collected.
- Data Quality and Integrity: DHS should, to the extent practicable, ensure that PII is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete.
- Security: DHS should protect PII (in all media) through appropriate security safeguards against risks such as loss, unauthorized access or use, destruction, modification, or unintended or inappropriate disclosure.
- Accountability and Auditing: DHS should be accountable for complying with these principles, providing training to all employees and contractors who use PII, and auditing the actual use of PII to demonstrate compliance with these principles and all applicable privacy protection requirements.³³

The DHS issuance is noteworthy for American statutory analysis since it implements the first statutory reference to fair information practices. The DHS FIPPs includes eight principles that match up closely but not precisely with the OECD version. Differences include: a) the replacement of the OECD Collection Limitation Principle with a Data Minimization Principle; b) the movement of some elements from one principle to another (e.g., the provision for obtaining data with the knowledge or consent of the data subject is part of the DHS Individual Participation Principle); c) elimination of the requirement for collection by fair and lawful means (DHS may

³³ See Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum (2008) (Memorandum Number 2008-1), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_policyguide_2008-01.pdf.

have assumed that it only acts in lawful ways); d) some additional specificity appropriate for specific implementation with a particular organization (e.g., requiring employee and contractor training); and e) the addition of a requirement that DHS specifically articulate the authority that permits the collection of PII to the Purpose Specification principle. The last of these differences may be a reflection of the Privacy Act of 1974 requirement that each federal agency inform an individual of the authority that authorizes solicitation of information.³⁴

FIPs vs. FIPPS

It may be that the US Department of Homeland Security first introduced *FIPPS* as a formal alternative label to FIPs for describing Fair Information Practices. Earlier reports by the Federal Trade Commission in 1998 and 2000 (cited earlier) used Fair Information Practices with and without “Principles”.

Some other US agencies and a few organizations outside the federal government have now adopted FIPPS. The difference in labeling appears wholly one of style. While there are sometimes substantive differences between statements of *FIPPS* and classic statements of *FIPs*, the differences are no greater in degree or kind than differences among various statements of *FIPs*. Some, who may be called traditionalists (including the author of this history), much prefer *FIPs*.

C. 2011 NSTIC

In April 2011, the Obama White House included a version of FIPs in a report by the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC). This version is noteworthy because it came with the White House imprimatur and appears to be the first version of FIPs so endorsed. It is also clear that principles set out in the NSTIC report seek to guide private sector entities as well as government agencies that participate in the Report’s recommended *Identity Ecosystem* for online identification and authentication. Thus, the NSTIC report is notable for the White House’s extension of FIPPS to the private sector, at least in this context.

- **Transparency:** Organizations should be transparent and notify individuals regarding collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance of personally identifiable information (PII).

- **Individual Participation:** Organizations should involve the individual in the process of using PII and, to the extent practicable, seek individual consent for the collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance of PII. Organizations should also provide mechanisms for appropriate access, correction, and redress regarding use of PII.

³⁴ 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(A), <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a>.

- **Purpose Specification:** Organizations should specifically articulate the authority that permits the collection of PII and specifically articulate the purpose or purposes for which the PII is intended to be used.

- **Data Minimization:** Organizations should only collect PII that is directly relevant and necessary to accomplish the specified purpose(s) and only retain PII for as long as is necessary to fulfill the specified purpose(s).

- **Use Limitation:** Organizations should use PII solely for the purpose(s) specified in the notice. Sharing PII should be for a purpose compatible with the purpose for which the PII was collected.

- **Data Quality and Integrity:** Organizations should, to the extent practicable, ensure that PII is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete.

- **Security:** Organizations should protect PII (in all media) through appropriate security safeguards against risks such as loss, unauthorized access or use, destruction, modification, or unintended or inappropriate disclosure.

- **Accountability and Auditing:** Organizations should be accountable for complying with these principles, providing training to all employees and contractors who use PII, and auditing the actual use of PII to demonstrate compliance with these principles and all applicable privacy protection requirements.³⁵

Like DHS, NSTIC calls its version FIPPs, and it is clear that NSTIC derived it from the DHS version. The differences with the DHS version are not explained, although most simply reflect the more general restatement of the principles for *organizations* rather than just for DHS. However, because of a revision of the Transparency Principle, there is no prior reference for *the notice* mentioned in the Use Limitation Principle. Also, the extension of the Purpose Specification Principle's requirement for stating the authority that permits the collection of PII may not be meaningful for all non-governmental activities.

D. 2011 National Science and Technology Council

In June 2011, the White House released a second document that relied on FIPPs as a core policy. The National Science and Technology Council issued a report titled A Policy Framework for the 21st Century Grid: Enabling Our Secure Energy Future.³⁶ The report outlines policy recommendations that build upon the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 and the Obama Administration's smart grid investments to foster long-term investment, job growth, innovation, and help consumers save money.

³⁵ National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, *Enhancing Online Choice, Efficiency, Security, and Privacy* at Appendix A (2011),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/NSTICstrategy_041511.pdf.

³⁶ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/nstc-smart-grid-june2011.pdf>.

The report's policy framework rests on four pillars for a smarter grid: (a) enabling cost-effective smart grid investments; (b) unlocking the potential of innovation in the electric sector; (c) empowering consumers and enabling informed decision making; and (d) securing the grid from cybersecurity threats. One of the key actions for the third pillar provides:

10. State and Federal regulators should consider, as a starting point, methods to ensure that consumers' detailed energy usage data are protected in a manner consistent with Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) and develop, as appropriate, approaches to address particular issues unique to energy usage. FIPPs are widely accepted principles adopted by government agencies and intergovernmental organizations to ensure protection of personal information. The Administration supports legislation that would make FIPPs the baseline for protecting personal data in commercial sectors not currently subject to sector specific Federal privacy statutes.

The report does not include a full statement of FIPPs, but it cites various other documents on FIPPs and it observes: *At present, there is not in place a comprehensive and broadly-accepted application of Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) in the smart grid context.*³⁷

E. 2012 Department of Commerce

In February 2012, the White House issued yet another version of FIPPs in the context of a report on consumer privacy titled A Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy.³⁸ The Department of Commerce prepared the report.

The 2012 report included a Consumer Bill of Rights that “applies comprehensive, globally recognized Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs).”

The text of the Consumer Bill of Rights follows.

The Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights applies to personal data, which means any data, including aggregations of data, which is linkable to a specific individual. Personal data may include data that is linked to a specific computer or other device. The Administration supports Federal legislation that adopts the principles of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights. Even without legislation, the Administration will convene multistakeholder processes that use these rights as a template for codes of conduct that are enforceable by the Federal Trade Commission. These elements—the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, codes of conduct, and strong enforcement—will increase interoperability between the U.S. consumer data privacy framework and those of our international partners.

1. INDIVIDUAL CONTROL: Consumers have a right to exercise control over what personal data companies collect from them and how they use it. Companies should provide consumers appropriate control over the personal data

³⁷ Id. at 46.

³⁸ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf>.

that consumers share with others and over how companies collect, use, or disclose personal data. Companies should enable these choices by providing consumers with easily used and accessible mechanisms that reflect the scale, scope, and sensitivity of the personal data that they collect, use, or disclose, as well as the sensitivity of the uses they make of personal data. Companies should offer consumers clear and simple choices, presented at times and in ways that enable consumers to make meaningful decisions about personal data collection, use, and disclosure. Companies should offer consumers means to withdraw or limit consent that are as accessible and easily used as the methods for granting consent in the first place.

2. TRANSPARENCY: Consumers have a right to easily understandable and accessible information about privacy and security practices. At times and in places that are most useful to enabling consumers to gain a meaningful understanding of privacy risks and the ability to exercise Individual Control, companies should provide clear descriptions of what personal data they collect, why they need the data, how they will use it, when they will delete the data or de-identify it from consumers, and whether and for what purposes they may share personal data with third parties.

3. RESPECT FOR CONTEXT: Consumers have a right to expect that companies will collect, use, and disclose personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in which consumers provide the data. Companies should limit their use and disclosure of personal data to those purposes that are consistent with both the relationship that they have with consumers and the context in which consumers originally disclosed the data, unless required by law to do otherwise. If companies will use or disclose personal data for other purposes, they should provide heightened Transparency and Individual Choice by disclosing these other purposes in a manner that is prominent and easily actionable by consumers at the time of data collection. If, subsequent to collection, companies decide to use or disclose personal data for purposes that are inconsistent with the context in which the data was disclosed, they must provide heightened measures of Transparency and Individual Choice. Finally, the age and familiarity with technology of consumers who engage with a company are important elements of context. Companies should fulfill the obligations under this principle in ways that are appropriate for the age and sophistication of consumers. In particular, the principles in the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights may require greater protections for personal data obtained from children and teenagers than for adults.

4. SECURITY: Consumers have a right to secure and responsible handling of personal data. Companies should assess the privacy and security risks associated with their personal data practices and maintain reasonable safeguards to control risks such as loss; unauthorized access, use, destruction, or modification; and improper disclosure.

5. ACCESS AND ACCURACY: Consumers have a right to access and correct personal data in usable formats, in a manner that is appropriate to the sensitivity of the data and the risk of adverse consequences to consumers if the data is inaccurate. Companies should use reasonable measures to ensure they maintain accurate personal data. Companies also should provide consumers with reasonable access to personal data that they collect or maintain about them, as well as the appropriate means and opportunity to correct inaccurate data or request its deletion or use limitation. Companies that handle personal data should construe this principle in a manner consistent with freedom of expression and freedom of the press. In determining what measures, they may use to maintain accuracy and to provide access, correction, deletion, or suppression capabilities to consumers, companies may also consider the scale, scope, and sensitivity of the personal data that they collect or maintain and the likelihood that its use may expose consumers to financial, physical, or other material harm.

6. FOCUSED COLLECTION: Consumers have a right to reasonable limits on the personal data that companies collect and retain. Companies should collect only as much personal data as they need to accomplish purposes specified under the Respect for Context principle. Companies should securely dispose of or de-identify personal data once they no longer need it, unless they are under a legal obligation to do otherwise.

7. ACCOUNTABILITY: Consumers have a right to have personal data handled by companies with appropriate measures in place to assure they adhere to the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights. Companies should be accountable to enforcement authorities and consumers for adhering to these principles. Companies also should hold employees responsible for adhering to these principles. To achieve this end, companies should train their employees as appropriate to handle personal data consistently with these principles and regularly evaluate their performance in this regard. Where appropriate, companies should conduct full audits. Companies that disclose personal data to third parties should at a minimum ensure that the recipients are under enforceable contractual obligations to adhere to these principles, unless they are required by law to do otherwise.

The White House/Department of Commerce report includes Appendix B (not reproduced here) that provides a chart that compares the proposed Consumer Bill of Rights with other statements of FIPPs. The other statements in the chart are the OECD Privacy Guidelines, the DHS privacy policy, and the APEC principles.

Much could be said about the proposed Consumer Bill of Rights. Analysis here is limited to a few points. First, this is the third document from the Obama White House that discusses and supports FIPPs. The others are found (and discussed above) in the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) and A Policy Framework for the 21st Century Grid: Enabling Our Secure Energy Future. The Consumer Bill of Rights version differs from the version in the NSTIC report. The third version is too summary to characterize.

Second, the first principle on individual control appears to limit consumer rights to “personal data companies collect *from* consumers.” It apparently does not cover information from other sources. This has the potential to greatly limit the rights of consumers with respect to personal data held by companies as much data comes from third parties.

Third, the context principle seems to significantly lessen the restrictions found in the OECD principle of Use Limitation, which requires data subject consent or legal authority to change the uses specified. The Consumer Bill of Rights casts the policy in terms of “purposes that are consistent with the relationship between the consumer and a company” and “the context in which consumers originally disclosed the data.” The means of each of these phrases is far from clear. The context principle is not the only one in the Consumer Bill of Rights where the associated commentary apparently undermines the top-level principles.

Fourth, the White House seeks legislation adopting the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights. However, translating the top-level principles into legislation is not a simple task. Some have questioned the bona fides of the Commerce Department in consumer privacy matters. See, e.g., World Privacy Forum, The US Department of Commerce and International Privacy Activities: Indifference and Neglect (2010).³⁹

F. 2012 FTC

The Federal Trade Commission issued a major report about privacy in 2012. The report appears to support a framework that the Commission asserts is “consistent with the Fair Information Practice Principles first articulated almost 40 years ago.”⁴⁰ However, the text quoted in the last sentence immediately offers these principles:

- **Privacy by Design:** Build in privacy at every stage of product development
- **Simplified Choice for Businesses and Consumers:** Give consumers the ability to make decisions about their data at a relevant time and context, including through a Do Not Track mechanism, while reducing the burden on businesses of providing unnecessary choices; and
- **Greater Transparency:** Make information collection and use practices transparent.⁴¹

The Commission’s privacy framework is set out here, without the legislation recommendations or the Commission’s implementation plans.

SCOPE

³⁹ <http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/permalink/permalinknov222010.html>.

⁴⁰ Federal Trade Commission, *Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and PolicyMakers* Executive Summary at i (2012), <http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf>.

⁴¹ Executive Summary at i.

Final Scope: The framework applies to all commercial entities that collect or use consumer data that can be reasonably linked to a specific consumer, computer, or other device, unless the entity collects only nonsensitive data from fewer than 5,000 consumers per year and does not share the data with third parties.

PRIVACY BY DESIGN

Baseline Principle: Companies should promote consumer privacy throughout their organizations and at every stage of the development of their products and services.

A. The Substantive Principles

Final Principle: Companies should incorporate substantive privacy protections into their practices, such as data security, reasonable collection limits, sound retention and disposal practices, and data accuracy.

B. Procedural Protections to Implement the Substantive Principles

Final Principle: Companies should maintain comprehensive data management procedures throughout the life cycle of their products and services.

SIMPLIFIED CONSUMER CHOICE

Baseline Principle: Companies should simplify consumer choice.

A. Practices That Do Not Require Choice

Final Principle: Companies do not need to provide choice before collecting and using consumer data for practices that are consistent with the context of the transaction or the company's relationship with the consumer, or are required or specifically authorized by law. To balance the desire for flexibility with the need to limit the types of practices for which choice is not required, the Commission has refined the final framework so that companies engaged in practices consistent

B. Companies Should Provide Consumer Choice for Other Practices

Final Principle: For practices requiring choice, companies should offer the choice at a time and in a context in which the consumer is making a decision about his or her data. Companies should obtain affirmative express consent before (1) using consumer data in a materially different manner than claimed when the data was collected; or (2) collecting sensitive data for certain purposes. The Commission commends industry's efforts to improve consumer control over online behavioral tracking by developing a Do Not Track mechanism, and encourages continued improvements and full implementation of those mechanisms.

TRANSPARENCY

Baseline Principle: Companies should increase the transparency of their data practices.

A. Privacy notices

Final Principle: Privacy notices should be clearer, shorter, and more standardized to enable better comprehension and comparison of privacy practices.

B. Access

Final Principle: Companies should provide reasonable access to the consumer data they maintain; the extent of access should be proportionate to the sensitivity of the data and the nature of its use. The Commission has amplified its support for this principle by including specific recommendations governing the practices of information brokers.

C. Consumer Education

Final Principle: All stakeholders should expand their efforts to educate consumers about commercial data privacy practices.⁴²

While transparency is a classic FIPs principle, neither Privacy by Design nor Simplified Choice qualifies. The word *choice* does not appear in the classic OECD formulation of FIPs. It is unclear from the report whether the Commission is embracing FIPs or restating FIPs. It is unclear whether other FIPs principles not mentioned are being abandoned or just ignored. The Commission is under no obligation to take a position on FIPs or to state whether its framework satisfies FIPs standards. Its characterization of *consistency* with FIPs is ambiguous, probably quite deliberately so.

The Commission is another in an increasingly long list of producers of privacy principles that sought in some way to suggest that its principles align in some way with the classic statement of FIPs without necessarily supporting all of the classic principles. FIPs may have become a form of generic trademark for privacy principles rather than an indicator of any affiliation with the original standards.

G. 2012 HHS

The Department of Health and Human Services has a variety of health technology and health privacy responsibilities. Some form of FIPs appears to be the basis for policy, but it is not clear that the Department relies on a clear and consistent version of FIPs.

⁴² Id. at vii-viii.

The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) located in the Department of Health and Human Services makes policy using a version of Fair Information Practice Principles.

This version of FIPPs may have originated with a 2008 speech of then HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt.⁴³ In that speech, Secretary Leavitt, “announced key privacy principles and a toolkit to guide efforts to harness the potential of new technology and more effective data analysis, while protecting privacy.”

Individual Access – Consumers should be provided with a simple and timely means to access and obtain their personal health information in a readable form and format.

Correction – Consumers should be provided with a timely means to dispute the accuracy or integrity of their personal identifiable health information, and to have erroneous information corrected or to have a dispute documented if their requests are denied. Consumers also should be able to add to and amend personal health information in products controlled by them such as personal health records (PHRs).

Openness and Transparency – Consumers should have information about the policies and practices related to the collection, use and disclosure of their personal information. This can be accomplished through an easy-to-read, standard notice about how their personal health information is protected. This notice should indicate with whom their information can or cannot be shared, under what conditions and how they can exercise choice over such collections, uses and disclosures. In addition, consumers should have reasonable opportunities to review who has accessed their personal identifiable health information and to whom it has been disclosed.

Individual Choice – Consumers should be empowered to make decisions about with whom, when, and how their personal health information is shared (or not shared).

Collection, Use, and Disclosure Limitation – It is important to limit the collection, use and disclosure of personal health information to the extent necessary to accomplish a specified purpose. The ability to collect and analyze health care data as part of a public good serves the American people and it should be encouraged. But every precaution must be taken to ensure that this personal health information is secured, deidentified when appropriate, limited in scope and protected wherever possible.

⁴³ Speech before the Nationwide Health Information Network Forum (Dec. 15, 2008), <http://www.digitalcommunities.com/articles/HHSs-Leavitt-Announces-New-Privacy-Principles.html>. This speech remained accessible on the ONC website, at least during part of 2012, but it disappeared by 2015. The maintenance of the speech for so long into the Obama Administration is mildly noteworthy because Leavitt was Secretary during the Administration of George W. Bush.

Data Integrity – Those who hold records must take reasonable steps to ensure that information is accurate and up-to-date and has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner. This principle is tightly linked to the correction principle. A process must exist in which, if consumers perceive a part of their record is inaccurate, they can notify their provider. Of course the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule provides consumers that right, but this principle should be applied even where the information is not covered by the Rule.

Safeguards – Personal identifiable health information should be protected with reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure its confidentiality, integrity, and availability and to prevent unauthorized or inappropriate access, use, or disclosure.

Accountability – Compliance with these principles is strongly encouraged so that Americans can realize the benefit of electronic health information exchange. Those who break rules and put consumers' personal health information at risk must not be tolerated. Consumers need to be confident that violators will be held accountable.

While not identified expressly as FIPs, the principles look mostly like FIPs. There are eight principles, although collection limitation is oddly grouped with use and disclosure limitation, and access and correction (often called *individual participation*) have been separated into two separate principles. Choice is not a classic FIPs principle.

The Office for Civil Rights at HHS is responsible for implementation and enforcement of the health privacy and security rules under HIPAA. At an OCR website on *Health Information Technology*, OCR sets out a *Privacy and Security Framework*.⁴⁴ The Framework has six elements:

CORRECTION PRINCIPLE: Individuals should be provided with a timely means to dispute the accuracy or integrity of their individually identifiable health information, and to have erroneous information corrected or to have a dispute documented if their requests are denied.

OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY PRINCIPLE: There should be openness and transparency about policies, procedures, and technologies that directly affect individuals and/or their individually identifiable health information.

INDIVIDUAL CHOICE PRINCIPLE: Individuals should be provided a reasonable opportunity and capability to make informed decisions about the collection, use, and disclosure of their individually identifiable health information.

⁴⁴ <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/healthit/>.

COLLECTION, USE, AND DISCLOSURE LIMITATION PRINCIPLE:

Individually identifiable health information should be collected, used, and/or disclosed only to the extent necessary to accomplish a specified purpose(s) and never to discriminate inappropriately.

SAFEGUARDS PRINCIPLE: Individually identifiable health information should be protected with reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure its confidentiality, integrity, and availability and to prevent unauthorized or inappropriate access, use, or disclosure.

ACCOUNTABILITY PRINCIPLE: The Principles in the Privacy and Security Framework should be implemented, and adherence assured, through appropriate monitoring and other means and methods should be in place to report and mitigate non-adherence and breaches.

These elements sometimes use the same language as the Leavitt principles, sometimes offer similar policies in different words, and sometimes leave out statements found in the Leavitt principles. Oddly, the OCR framework does not expressly address the data integrity or access principles identified by Secretary Leavitt.

In March 2012, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS), which is part of HHS, published a final rule regarding affordable insurance exchanges consistent with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.⁴⁵ The rule is long and complex, but for present purposes, it “includes privacy and security principles based on the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) framework adopted by ONCHIT.”⁴⁶ The adopted principles are:

- (i) Individual access. Individuals should be provided with a simple and timely means to access and obtain their personally identifiable health information in a readable form and format.
- (ii) Correction. Individuals should be provided with a timely means to dispute the accuracy or integrity of their personally identifiable health information and to have erroneous information corrected or to have a dispute documented if their requests are denied.
- (iii) Openness and transparency. There should be openness and transparency about policies, procedures, and technologies that directly affect individuals and/or their personally identifiable health information.
- (iv) Individual choice. Individuals should be provided a reasonable opportunity and capability to make informed decisions about the collection, use, and disclosure of their personally identifiable health information.

⁴⁵ 77 Federal Register 18310 (March 27, 2012), <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-03-27/pdf/2012-6125.pdf>.

⁴⁶ Id. at 18436.

(v) Collection, use, and disclosure limitations. Personally identifiable health information should be created, collected, used, and/or disclosed only to the extent necessary to accomplish a specified purpose(s) and never to discriminate inappropriately.

(vi) Data quality and integrity. Persons and entities should take reasonable steps to ensure that personally identifiable health information is complete, accurate, and up-to-date to the extent necessary for the person's or entity's intended purposes and has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner.

(vii) Safeguards. Personally identifiable health information should be protected with reasonable operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure its confidentiality, integrity, and availability and to prevent unauthorized or inappropriate access, use, or disclosure.

(viii) Accountability. These principles should be implemented, and adherence assured, through appropriate monitoring and other means and methods should be in place to report and mitigate non-adherence and breaches.

In comparing the CMS principles with the Leavitt principles and the OCR principles, the CMS principles are the same in some respects, broader in part, shorter in part, and different in part. At a high enough level of abstraction, there is much similarity in these three sets of principles. Yet there are clear and substantive policy differences at a secondary level. A detailed comparison of the three versions is left to the reader. The hardest part to understand is the absence of two entire principles from the OCR website. If there is a purpose behind the same Department offering three different versions of FIPs, it is not clear.

Overall, the number of versions of FIPs appears to increase with every repetition. Because FIPs are high-level principles, implementation in different contexts may differ. Often, the commentary accompanying the principles includes more details and more shaping to fit the context. The commentary may make some of the difference noted here to be more or less significant. However, the variation at the higher level of principle remains curious.

If the differences are purposeful, that purpose is not explained anywhere. During the Obama Administration alone, we find different versions of FIPs produced by NSTIC, by the Department of Commerce, and at least two versions from HHS (with another version left over from the previous Administration). The DHS FIPPS slightly predates the Obama Administration, but it remains in place and differs from all the rest. The FTC is an independent agency, and its version of FIPs (if it actually qualified as a version of FIPs) cannot be attributed to the Obama Administration. The National Science and Technology Council may have come the closest to the truth when it said, "At present, there is not in place a comprehensive and broadly-accepted application of Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) in the smart grid context." That statement appears to be true in other U.S. contexts. The lack of agreement within the same Administration and even within the same agency is noteworthy. The most likely explanation is that FIPs principles expand or contract with each writer and each application. The lack of any central privacy policy apparatus may be a contributing cause.

H. 2013 Executive Order on Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity

On February 12, 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order 13636 on critical infrastructure cybersecurity.⁴⁷ The order broadly directs federal agencies to share more cyber threat information with the private sector. This is apparently the first Executive Order to reference FIPs, and it uses a version of FIPs previously referenced in a White House NTSIC document.

The order tells agencies to “coordinate their activities under this order with their senior agency officials for privacy and civil liberties and ensure that privacy and civil liberties protections are incorporated into such activities.”⁴⁸ The required protections “shall be based upon the Fair Information Practice Principles and other privacy and civil liberties policies, principles, and frameworks as they apply to each agency’s activities.”⁴⁹ For purposes of the Executive Order, *Fair Information Practice Principles* means the eight principles set forth in Appendix A of the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace.⁵⁰

I. OMB Guidance for Providing and Using Administrative Data for Statistical Purposes

In February 2014, the Office of Management and Budget issued guidance to promote more interagency data sharing for statistical purposes.⁵¹ OMB argues that increased use of administrative data for statistical purposes can generate a range of benefits. The guidance includes an appropriate discussion of legal responsibilities for protecting privacy. The discussion of policies for privacy and confidentiality cites the Administration’s proposal for Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) as a framework for those policies. The guidance cites to the White House National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (April 2011).⁵²

J. Obama White House Big Data Report

In May 2014, the Executive Office of the President issued a report titled *Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values*.⁵³ The report included a brief history of FIPs, noting that “FIPPs form a common thread through these sectoral laws and a variety of international agreements.”⁵⁴ The report referenced the Department of Commerce’s 2012 privacy report’s reliance on FIPPs.⁵⁵ Interestingly, a companion report issued at the same time by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology referenced a Federal Trade Commission version of FIPs from 2000 that included only four principles.⁵⁶

⁴⁷ <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-02-19/pdf/2013-03915.pdf>.

⁴⁸ Id. at § 4(a).

⁴⁹ Id. at § 5.

⁵⁰ Id. at § 11(c).

⁵¹ Memorandum M-14-06, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2014/m-14-06.pdf>.

⁵² An earlier OMB memorandum, *Sharing Data While Protecting Privacy*, directed agencies to consult with established codes of FIPs, and the memo directed agencies to the original HEW report. Id. at text accompanying note 3.

⁵³ http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_5.1.14_final_print.pdf.

⁵⁴ Id. at 18.

⁵⁵ Id. at 61.

⁵⁶ President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, *Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective* (2014),

V. Comment and Criticism about FIPs

FIPs are not self-implementing or self-enforcing. Actual implementation of FIPs at the statutory, regulatory, or data controller level can vary widely, depending on the country, the data controller, the type of data, other conflicting goals, and other factors. For example, accountability can be met through many different mechanisms, including criminal or civil penalties; national or provincial supervisory officials; other administrative enforcement; various forms of self-regulation including industry codes and privacy seals; formal privacy policies; compliance audits; employee training; privacy officers at the data controller level; privacy impact assessments; and other methods. Similarly, providing data subjects with access to their own records may have different exceptions, depending on whether the records are employment, educational, credit, or law enforcement records. Implementation of FIPs in any context is often more a matter of art and judgment rather than a science or mechanical translation of principles.

Paula Bruening, a longstanding member of the international privacy community and currently (2015) Senior Counsel, Global Privacy Policy, at Intel, offered an important observation about FIPs in a recent blog post. She observed that FIPs provide a *common language* of privacy that provides value to all, regardless of their particular implementation of privacy principles.

Over time it's become clear that attempts to impose the privacy sensibilities or protection regimes of one country or region onto another usually meet with frustration. But internationally recognized, fundamental principles of fair information practices continue to provide a common language about data protection and privacy that has served nations, regions, companies and individuals around the world, without demanding a departure from local privacy values. And when there is a privacy or data protection failure, they provide a tool to measure compliance and a means of enforcement.⁵⁷

Australian Law Professor Graham Greenleaf,⁵⁸ a privacy scholar and prolific author, collects and publishes information about privacy laws around the world.⁵⁹ In a recent article, Greenleaf offers a useful perspective on the influence of basic privacy policy principles like FIPs on privacy laws around the world.⁶⁰ He finds ten elements common to all four international privacy instruments (the OECD Guidelines, Council of Europe Convention, EU Data Protection Directive, and the APEC Privacy Framework:

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf.

⁵⁷ Paula Bruening, Rethink Privacy 2.0 and Fair Information Practice Principles: A Common Language for Privacy (2014), Blogs@Intel, <http://blogs.intel.com/blog/rethink-privacy-2-0-and-fair-information-practice-principles-a-common-language-for-privacy/>. Bruening also observed: "The challenge lies in understanding how fair information practice principles can be applied in an effective, workable way in the cloud, across the Internet of Things, and for big data analytics. It's a challenge we must meet." Id.

⁵⁸ <http://www2.austlii.edu.au/~graham/>.

⁵⁹ See *Sheherezade and the 101 Data Privacy Laws: Origins, Significance and Global Trajectories*, UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2013-40, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2280877.

⁶⁰ Graham Greenleaf, *The influence of European data privacy standards outside Europe: Implications for Globalisation of Convention* 108 (2011), 2 *International Data Privacy Law* (2012), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1960299>.

1. Collection - limited, lawful and by fair means; with consent or knowledge
2. Data quality – relevant, accurate, up-to-date
3. Purpose specification at time of collection
4. Notice of purpose and rights at time of collection
5. Uses limited (including disclosures) to purposes specified or compatible
6. Security through reasonable safeguards
7. Openness re personal data practices
8. Access – individual right of access
9. Correction – individual right of correction
10. Accountable – data controllers accountable for implementation⁶¹

These are the basic FIPs principles restated into ten rather than eight elements. Greenleaf observes that “[t]here are often exception to, and variations of, these elements, but in one form or another, they are always found.”⁶² This underscores Bruening’s observation about FIPs as the common language of privacy.

Critics of FIPs can be found on both sides. Some in the privacy community believe that FIPs are too weak, allow too many exemptions, do not require a privacy agency, fail to account for the weaknesses of self-regulation, and have not kept pace with information technology.⁶³ Critics from a business perspective often prefer to limit FIPs to reduced elements of notice, consent, and accountability. They complain that other elements are unworkable, expensive, or inconsistent with openness or free speech principles. Some argue that the supposed benefits of so-called Big Data mean that the collection limitation principle should be weakened or abandoned. Daniel Solove and Chris Hoofnagle offer a different tack, a model regime of privacy protection based on FIPs with more specificity.⁶⁴

In 1999, Mr. Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia and former chair of the OECD Committee that developed the 1980 Guidelines spoke at an international privacy conference. He noted the many changes brought about by new computer and communication technologies and suggested that it may be time for a review of the guidelines. Among new rights that he mentioned as ripe for review were:

1. A right not to be indexed.
2. A right to encrypt personal information effectively.
3. A right to fair treatment in key public infrastructures so that no person is unfairly excluded in a way that would prejudice that person's ability to protect their privacy.

⁶¹ Id. at 7.

⁶² Id.

⁶³ Roger Clarke has been a leading critic of FIPs. See, e.g., his paper on *Research Use of Personal Data*, <http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/NSCF02.html>.

⁶⁴ Daniel J. Solove and Chris Jay Hoofnagle, *A Model Regime of Privacy Protection (Version 3.0)*, 2006 University of Illinois Law Review 357 (2006), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=881294>.

4. A right to human checking of adverse automated decisions and a right to understand such decisions.
5. A right, going beyond the aspiration of the 'openness principle', of disclosure of the collections to which others will have access and which might affect the projection of the profile of the individual concerned.⁶⁵

The 2013 revisions of the OECD Privacy Guidelines did not appear to address any of the new rights suggested by Mr. Justice Kirby.

As a result of the 2014 decision of the European Court of Justice in the *Google Spain* case, some suggest that the so-called right to be forgotten might be another new right.⁶⁶ The right to be forgotten may be similar to Mr. Justice Kirby's suggested right not to be indexed.

The Open Identity Exchange published (under a Creative Commons license) a *Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) Comparison Tool*. This document lists FIPPs principles by subject rather than by source, and it includes principles from more than a dozen sources. This presentation will be useful to many with an interest in FIPPs. Appendix 2 to the document is noteworthy for its "extended discussion of how the FIPPs tool can help parties engaged in current trust framework development and drafting and in future legal standardization efforts, and its relationship to other trust framework development tools and processes."

<http://openidentityexchange.org/wiki/fair-information-practice-principles-fipps-comparison-tool>.

On the thirtieth anniversary of the OECD Guidelines, the OECD held a conference on the impact of the Guidelines, sponsored several roundtables, and commissioned papers.⁶⁷ Mr. Justice Michael Kirby was one of the participants, and his speech gives new insight on the origins of the original Guidelines and on new challenges, which include new systems of mass surveillance; the need for privacy enhancing technologies; cross-border cooperation in drafting, implementation, and enforcement; end user education; and including developing nations in privacy discussions.⁶⁸

Other information and documents pertaining to the 30th anniversary of the OECD Guidelines are available.⁶⁹ Of particular note is an April 2011 OECD paper titled *The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the OECD Privacy Guidelines*. The paper offers a review of the development and influence of the Guidelines, describes current trends in the processing of personal data and the privacy risks, and concludes that the "OECD Privacy Guidelines have been

⁶⁵ Michael Kirby, *Privacy Protection – A New Beginning*, (1999) (speech before the 21st International Conference on Privacy and Personal Data Protection), <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/1999/41.html>.

⁶⁶ *Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD)*, Mario Costeja González, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (Case C-131/12), <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30d55d64d9a37b5a477eac11d72c1de1eb84.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuNb3z0?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=265967>.

⁶⁷ www.oecd.org/sti/privacyanniversary.

⁶⁸ www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/62/44945835.doc.

⁶⁹ www.oecd.org/sti/privacyanniversary.

a remarkable success.”⁷⁰ The 2011 paper was included with the 2013 revisions of the OECD Privacy Guidelines.

At the 30th anniversary event, Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, identified nine factors that contributed to the initial success of the OECD Guidelines: 1) The OECD Guidelines were forward-looking; 2) The Guidelines were narrow in scope and focused on a particular problem; 3) The Guidelines were intellectually coherent; 4) The Guidelines were technologically neutral; 5) The Guidelines have an institutional home; 6) There was at the outset broad participation from countries around the world; 7) The Guidelines had a champion; 8) Expertise of Committee; and 9) The Guidelines had the right level of specificity.⁷¹

Continuing support for FIPs among public interest and civil society groups is evidenced by the November 2009 Madrid Privacy Declaration. <http://thepublicvoice.org/madrid-declaration>. The declaration emerged from a meeting of the Public Voice Coalition held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the International Privacy and Data Protection and Commissioners. The Declaration, which has attracted signatures from over 300 groups, experts, and individuals, “[reaffirms] support for a global framework of Fair Information Practices that places obligations on those who collect and process personal information and gives rights to those whose personal information is collected.” Other parts of the Declaration support independent data protection authorities, call for ratification of Council of Europe Convention 108, and seek better legal frameworks for privacy protection, among other things.

Greenleaf’s analysis identified additional “European” elements that are indicative of higher (or stricter) standards that the EU Directive, the Council of Europe Convention, or both include:

1. Requirement of an independent Data Protection Authority as the key element of an enforcement regime
2. Requirement of recourse to the courts to enforce data privacy rights
3. Requirement of restrictions on personal data exports to countries which did not have a sufficient standard of privacy protection (defined as ‘adequate’)
4. Collection must be the minimum necessary for the purpose of collection, not simply ‘limited’
5. A general requirement of ‘fair and lawful processing’ (not just collection)
6. Requirements to notify, and sometimes provide ‘prior checking’, of particular types of processing systems
7. Destruction or anonymisation of personal data after a period
8. Additional protections for particular categories of sensitive data
9. Limits on automated decision-making, and a right to know the logic of automated data processing
10. Requirement to provide ‘opt-out’ of direct marketing uses of personal data.⁷²

⁷⁰ www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/the-evolving-privacy-landscape-30-years-after-the-oecd-privacy-guidelines_5kgf09z90c31-en.

⁷¹ www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44946274.doc. (This link does not work consistently. Keep trying.)

⁷² Graham Greenleaf, *The influence of European data privacy standards outside Europe: Implications for Globalisation of Convention 108* (2011), 2 *International Data Privacy Law* 8 (2012),

None of these ten elements is required by the original OECD Guidelines, but many can be found in whole or in part in national privacy laws today. Greenleaf offers the list of European elements for several purposes, including a comparison with the APEC Privacy Framework, which lacks all of them.⁷³

Greenleaf's list of higher privacy standards illustrates the recent evolution of privacy policy. This is not so much criticism that FIPs are outdated but that FIPs are no longer sufficient to address current needs. FIPs have not been abandoned or superseded in favor of the newer privacy elements. FIPs remain as foundational principles in privacy laws everywhere. It would be more accurate to say that technology, administrative developments, and a better understanding of what is needed to protect privacy are adding elements beyond FIPs to international privacy policy discussions, debates, standards, and laws.

Version History for this Document

Version 1.5 adds a discussion about the restatement of FIPs in the report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission. Thanks to Marc Rotenberg for pointing out the PPSC's connection to FIPs.

Version 1.6 adds a paragraph about the Department of Homeland Security's 2009 version of FIPs. It also adds a footnote reference to FIPs language in the statute establishing a Civil Liberties Protection Officer within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Version 1.7 expands the discussion about the Department of Homeland Security's Fair Information Practice Principles. It also updates some links and lists the 10 Canadian Standard Association principles in a note.

Version 1.8 adds a brief discussion of the OECD 30th anniversary conference on the OECD Guidelines.

Version 1.81 adds a reference to the OECD 30th anniversary webpage.

Version 1.82 adds a brief discussion of the 2010 FTC staff report, revises the DHS discussion slightly, adds a discussion of the NSTIC FIPs, and makes other mild revisions.

Version 1.83 adds a discussion of the June 2011 White House report on the energy grid.

<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1960299>. Greenleaf observes that this list is not exhaustive. Greenleaf's article appeared before the OECD issued its revised guidelines in 2013. As noted above, the revisions did not change the eight basic principles, but the OECD 2013 document introduced new concepts to the privacy framework, some of which overlap with Greenleaf's European elements.

⁷³ See also Graham Greenleaf, *ASIAN DATA PRIVACY LAWS Trade & Human Rights Perspectives* (2014), <https://global.oup.com/academic/product/asian-data-privacy-laws9780199679669?cc=us&lang=en&>.

Version 1.84 adds mention of an April 2011 OECD paper titled *The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the OECD Privacy Guidelines*.

Version 1.85 adds a paragraph on the 2009 Madrid Declaration.

Version 1.86 adds a paragraph on HIPAA and FIPs.

Version 1.87 adds a discussion of the February 2012 White House/Department of Commerce privacy report and Consumer Bill of Rights.

Version 1.88 adds a discussion of the 2012 FTC Report, of several HHS versions of FIPs, a bit of discussion of US FIPs versions, clearer sectioning of the report, mild revisions here and there, as well as some minor additions to footnotes, updated links, and a slightly revised summary.

Version 1.89 fixes some typos and adjusts a statement or two.

Version 1.90 adds a paragraph in Part V on the Open Identity Exchange's Fair Information Practice Principles Comparison Tool.

Version 1.91 adds a biographical footnote, makes minor editorial changes, and fixes some dead links. Thanks to Eric Charikane for pointing out the problem. Keeping links current in a document like this is very difficult.

Version 1.92 adds a discussion of EO 13636 and makes minor editorial changes.

Version 2.00 adds a discussion of the revised 2013 OECD Privacy Guidelines and makes minor editorial changes throughout (including changes to subsection numbering in Part IV). The reissuance of the OECD Privacy Guidelines is the justification for an increase in the revision number to the next major number. A subsection on recent history of FIPs, where discussion of the revised Guidelines appears, is new.

Version 2.01 adds a discussion of Marc's Rotenberg's speech at the OECD conference on the 30th anniversary of the guidelines.

Version 2.02 adds in a footnote a reference to a 1975 Massachusetts FIPs law and makes minor editorial changes here and there. The text box about FIPs and FIPs is new with this version.

Version 2.1 updates to a new version of the Creative Commons License; adds links to transcripts of the 1972 HEW Committee that first proposed FIPs; includes a discussion of Graham Greenleaf's analysis of international privacy laws and standards; and revises the document's summary.

Version 2.11 adds Willis Ware's description of the origins of FIPs in an early footnote, a discussion of the February 2014 OMB Guidance for Providing and Using Administrative Data for Statistical Purposes, and fixes some typos. Always more typos!

Version 2.12 adds a reference to my article about Willis Ware and FIPs. It adds a discussion of the White House's 2014 Big Data reports. A discussion of the 2000 FTC report now offers more detail on the different versions of FIPs that the Commission identified in its 1998 and 2000 reports. The discussion of FIPs vs. FIPPS now includes a reference to the FTC's use of *principles* in connection with FIPs as early as 1998. Some links are updated.

Version 2.13 makes a modest number of minor edits and corrections to text, footnotes, and links.

Version 2.14 corrects typos and updates links. Thanks to Stephanie Perrin for finding the problems. I added a few new resources here and there and fixed some additional links.

Version 2.15 adds Paula Bruening's observation that FIPs is the common language of privacy, and adds, moves, and revises text in the last section.